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Abstract. In this paper, we address the problem of designing a robust reputation
mechanism for peer-to-peer services. The mechanism we propose achieves high
robustness against malicious peers (from individual or collusive ones) and pro-
vides incentive for participation. We show that the quality of the reputation value
of trustworthy and participating peers is always better than the one of cheating
and non participating ones. Finally we formally prove that, even when a high
fraction of peers of the system exhibits a collusive behavior, a correct peer can
still compute an accurate reputation mechanism towards a server, at the expense
of a reasonable convergence time.
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1 Introduction
With the emergence of e-commerce in open, large-scale distributed marketplaces, repu-
tation systems are becoming attractive for encouraging trust among entities that usually
do not know each other. A reputation system collects, distributes, and aggregates feed-
back about the past behavior of a given entity. The derived reputation score is used to
help entities to decide whether a future interaction with that entity is conceivable or not.
Without reputation systems, the temptation to act abusively for immediate gain can be
stronger than the one of cooperating. In closed environments, reputation systems are
controlled and managed by large centralized enforcement institutions. Designing repu-
tation systems in P2P systems has to face the absence of such large and recognizable but
costly organizations capable of assessing the trustworthiness of a service provider. The
only viable alternative is to rely on informal social mechanisms for encouraging trust-
worthy behavior [9]. Proposed mechanisms often adopt the principle that ”you trust the
people that you know best”, just like in the word-of-mouth system, and build transitivity
trust structures in which credible peers are selected [19–21]. However such structures
rely on the willingness of entities to propagate information. Facing free-riding and more
generally under-participation is a well known problem experienced in most open infras-
tructures [2]. The efficiency and accuracy of a reputation system depends heavily on the
amount of feedback it receives from participants. According to a recognized principle
in economics, providing rewards is an effective way to improve feedback. However re-
warding participation may also increase the incentive for providing false information.
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Thus there is a trade-off between collecting a sizable set of information and facing un-
reliable feedback [7]. An additional problem that needs to be faced with P2P systems,
is that peers attempt to collectively subvert the system. Peers may collude either to
discredit the reputation of a provider to lately benefit from it (bad mouthing), or to ad-
vertise the quality of service more than its real value to increase their reputation (ballot
stuffing). Lot of proposed mechanisms break down if raters collude [8].
In this paper we address the robust reputation problem. Essentially this problem
aims at motivating peers to send sufficiently honest feedback in P2P systems in which
peers may free-ride or be dishonest. This work has been motivated by a previous one in
which the proposed architecture is built on top of a supervising overlay made of trusted
peers [3]. The mechanism we propose achieves high robustness to attacks (from indi-
vidual peers or from collusive ones), and provides incentive for participation. This is
accomplished by an aggregation technique in which a bounded number of peers ran-
domly selected within the system report directly observed information to requesting
peers. Observations are weighted by a credibility factor locally computed. Incentive for
participation is implemented through a fair differential service mechanism. It relies on
peer’s level of participation, a measure of peers’ contribution over a fixed period of
time, and on the credibility factor, assessing the confidence one has in a peer.
Our results are promising: We prove that through sufficient and honest cooperation,
peers increase the quality of their reputation mechanism. We show that the reputation
estimation efficiently filters out malicious behaviors in an adaptive way. Presence of
a high fraction of malicious peers does not prevent a correct peer from computing an
accurate reputation value, at the expense of a reasonable convergence time. Further-
more, the trade-off between the sensitivity of the mechanism facing up malicious peers
and the duration of the computation is tuned through a single input parameter. These
properties, combined with the incentive scheme, makes our mechanism adapted to P2P
networks. Finally, we provide a full theoretical evaluation of our solution. For space
reasons proofs of correctness are given in the full version of the paper [4].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 related work is reviewed.
Section 3 presents the model of the environment, and the specification of the robust rep-
utation problem. Section 4 presents the incentive-based mechanism. Section 5 analyses
its asymptotic behavior, its resistance to undesirable behavior and its convergence time.
2 Related Work
There is a rapidly growing literature on the theory and applications of reputation sys-
tems, and several surveys offer a large analyze of the state of art in reputation systems
[15, 11, 8]. According to the way ratings are propagated among entities and the extent
of knowledge needed to perform the needed computations, reputation systems fall into
two classes, namely centralized or distributed. An increasing number of online commu-
nities applications incorporating reputation mechanisms based on centralized databases
has recently emerged. The eBay rating system used to find traders allows partners to
rate each other after completion of an auction. Despite its primitive reputation system,
ebay is the largest person-to-person online auction with more than 4 millions auctions
open at a time [16]. Regardless of this success, centralized approaches (see for exam-
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ple, [21, 18]) often pay little attention to misbehaving entities by assuming that entities
give honest feedback to the requesting entity. More importantly, they rarely address
non-participation and collusive behaviors.
Regarding decentralized p2p architecture, several research studies on reputation-
based P2P systems have emerged. Among the first ones, Aberer and Despotovic [1]
propose a reputation mechanism in which trust information is stored in P-Grid, a dis-
tributed hash table-based (DHT) overlay. Their mechanism is made robust by guaran-
teeing that trust information is replicated at different peers, and thus can be accessed
despite malicious entities. However, the efficiency of their approach relies on peers
propensity to fully cooperate by forwarding requests to feed the P-Grid overlay. Addi-
tionally, as for most of the DHT-based approaches, peers have to store data they are not
concerned with. Thus, malicious peers may discard it to save private resources, leading
to a loss of information. Other systems relying on the trust transitivity approach face
false ratings by assuming the presence of specific faithful and trustworthy peers (e.g.
[13]), or by weighting second-hand ratings by senders’ credibility [7, 19, 20]. Opposed
to the aforementioned works, Havelaar reputation system [10], exploits long-lived peers
by propagating reports between sets of well defined peers identified through hash func-
tions. A report contains the observations made during the current round, the aggregated
observations made by the predecessors during the previous round, and so on for the
last r rounds. By relying on such an extensive aggregation, false reports hardly in-
fluence the overall outcome. Furthermore by using hash functions collusion is mostly
prevented. The efficiency of their approach mainly relies on the readiness of peers to
store and propagate large amount of data, and to remain in the system for relatively
long periods of time. To motivate peers to participate, Jurca and Faltings [12] propose
an incentive-compatible mechanism by introducing payment for reputation. A set of
brokers, the R-agents, buy and sell feedback information. An entity can receive a pay-
ment only if the next entity reports the same result. Weakness of such an approach is
the centralization of the whole information at R-agents, and its robustness against ma-
licious R-agents. Finally, Awerbuch et al. [5, 6] give lower bounds on the costs of the
probes made by honest peers to find good objects in eBay-like systems, and propose
algorithms that nearly attain these bounds.
In contrast to these works, we propose a fully distributed mechanism based on lo-
cal knowledge that provides malicious and non-participating entities an incentive for
participation and honest behavior.
3 Model
3.1 A P2P Service Model
We consider a P2P service system where service providers (or servers) repeatedly offer
the same service to interested peers. We assume that the characteristics of a server
(capabilities, willingness to offer resources, etc) are aggregated into a single parameter θ
called type. This type influences the effort exerted by the server through a cost function
c. The effort determines the Quality of the Service (QoS) provided by the server. We
assume that the effort exerted by a server is the same for all the peers that solicit him
and takes its value within the interval [0, 1].
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Definition 1 (Effort). The effort of a service provider s is a value q∗s that determines
the quality of the service offered to the peers that interact with s.
After each interaction with server s, each client (or peer) has an imperfect observation of
the effort exerted by s. Peers may have different tastes about a server QOS. But basically
these observations are closely distributed around s’s effort. Thus, we reasonably assume
that an observed quality of service takes its value within the interval [0, 1] and follows
a normal distribution of mean q∗s and variance σ∗s .
Definition 2 (Observed Quality of Service Level). The Observed Quality of Service
Level of a service provider s observed by peer p at time t is a value obssp(t) which
is drawn from a normal distribution over [0, 1] with mean q∗s . The value 1 (resp. 0)
characterizes the maximal (resp. minimal) satisfaction of p.
Estimation of the expected behavior of a server is based on its recent past behavior, that
is, its recent interactions with the peers of the system. Such a restriction is motivated by
game theoretic results and empirical studies on ebay that show that only recent ratings
are meaningful [8]. Thus, in the following, only interactions that occur within a sliding
window of width D 1 are considered. This approach is also consistent with Shapiro’s
work [17] in which it is proven that in an environment where peers can change their
effort over time the efficiency of a reputation mechanism is maximized by giving higher
weights on recent ratings and discounting older ratings. Using a sliding time window is
approximately equivalent to this model. Every time a peer p desires to interact with a
server s, p asks for feedback from peers that may have directly interacted with s during
the last D time units. We adopt the terminology witness to denote a peer solicited for
providing its feedback. If Psp(t) represents the set of peers k whose feedback has been
received by peer p by time t, then the reputation value of a server is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Reputation Value). The reputation value rsp(t) of server s computed by
peer p at time t is an estimation of the effort q∗s exerted by s based on the feedbacks
provided by the peers in Psp(t).
3.2 Specification of Undesirable Behaviors
In practice, peers may not always reveal their real ratings about other peers. They can
either exaggerate their ratings (by increasing or decreasing them), or they can simply
reveal outright ratings to maximize their welfare. This behavior is usually called mali-
cious, and can either be exhibited by a node independently from the behavior of other
peers, or be emergent of the behavior of a whole group. By providing false ratings,
malicious peers usually try to skew the reputation value of a server to a value which
is different from its true effort. Let q be this value, and d be the distance between the
true effort of the server and the false rating (d = |q∗s − q|). Then, we characterize the
behavior of a peer by wsq = 1 − dα, with α a positive real value which represents the
sensitivity of wsq to the distance between the effort and the expected observation given
by q. A malicious peer tries to skew the reputation value to q by sending ratings that are
distributed around q.
1 D can have any pre-defined length of time, i.e., a day, a week or a month. In the sequel, we
suppose that D is insensitive to clock drift.
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Definition 4 (Malicious). A peer p is called malicious if it lies on the reputation of
peer s or creates s’s reputation out of thin air. Formally :
E(obssp(t)) = q 6= q∗s , ∀t.
Definition 5 (Collusive Group). A group of peers is called a collusive group if all the
peers of this group behave maliciously towards a same goal. Formally, the set C is a
colluding group if :
E(obssk(t)) = q 6= q∗s , ∀t, k ∈ C.
Another common behavior in P2P systems is peers non-participation. There are two
main reasons why peers may not participate: either because they believe that their work
is redundant with what the others in the group can do, and thus their participation can
hardly influence the group’s outcome, or because they believe that by not contribut-
ing they maximize their own welfare (note that information retention could be another
pretense of not participating, however this is out of the scope of the paper). The latter
behavior depicts what is typically called free-riding, while the first one is described in
the Collective Effort Model (CEM) as social loafing [14]. Note that although effects of
both behaviors are similar, i.e., “non-participation”, their deep cause is different. Peers
exhibiting one of these two behaviors are called in the following non-participating peers
and are characterized as follows:
Definition 6 (Non Participating). A peer is called non participating if it exerts less
effort on a collective task than it does on a comparable individual task or consumes
more than its fair share of common resources.
A peer is called correct if during the time it is operational in the system it is neither
malicious nor non-participating. Note that a malicious peer may not participate, on the
other hand, a non participating one is not malicious.
3.3 Specification of the Robust Reputation Problem
Within this context, we address the problem of evaluating the reputation of a service
provider in a dynamic environment in which peers are not necessary correct. This prob-
lem is referred in the sequel as the robust reputation problem. A solution to this problem
should guarantee the following two properties. The first one states that eventually cor-
rect peers should be able to estimate the reputation value of a target server with a good
precision. The second one says that with high probability, correct peers have a better
estimation of the reputation value of a target server than non correct ones. Formally:
Property 1 (Reputation Value ǫ-Accuracy). Eventually, the reputation of server s, eval-
uated by any correct peer reflects s’s behavior with precision ǫ. That is, let β ∈]0, 1[ be
some fixed real, called in the sequel confidence level, then:
∃t s.t. ∀t ≥ t, Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ǫ) ≥ 1− β
Let |E(rsp(t))−q∗s | be the bias of the reputation value rsp(t) estimated by peer p. Suppose
that two peers p and q interact with the same target servers at the same time, solicit the
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same witnesses, and get the same feedbacks at the same time. That is from the point of
view of their interaction p and q are indistinguishable. However p is correct while q is
not. Then, we have:
Property 2 (Incentive-Compatibility). Eventually, the bias of the reputation value of
server s estimated by p is greater than or equal to the one estimated by peer q. That is,
for a given level of confidence β, we have:
∃t s.t. ∀t ≥ t, Prob(|E(rsp(t))− q∗s | ≥ |E(rsq(t))− q∗s |) ≥ 1− β
4 The Reputation Mechanism
We propose a distributed reputation service which builds a social network among peers.
Briefly, every peer records the opinion about the late experiences it has had with a tar-
get server. Peers provide their information on request from peers willing to interact
with that server. Providing a feedback based on direct observations (also called first-
hand observations) prevents the rumors phenomenon, i.e., the propagation of opinions
about others, just because they have been heard from someone else [19], however is bet-
ter adapted to applications with modest churn. Upon receipt of ”enough” feedback, the
requesting peer aggregates them with its own observations (if any) to estimate the rep-
utation of the target server, and provides this estimation to its application. Information
is aggregated according to the trust the requesting peer has in the received feedback.
Pseudo-code of the reputation mechanism is presented in Algorithm 1. The efficiency
of the reputation mechanism fully depends on i) the number of received feedbacks (i.e.,
aggregating few feedbacks is not meaningful and thus not helpful), and ii) the quality
of each of them (i.e., the trustworthiness of the feedback). The contribution of this work
is the design of a reputation mechanism that enjoys both properties. The analysis pre-
sented in Section 5 shows the importance of each factor on the convergence time and
accuracy of the reputation mechanism.
The solution we propose is a reputation mechanism, and therefore independent of
the rewarding strategy used by the application built on top of this mechanism. That is,
the willingness of a peer to interact with a server results from the application strategy,
not from the peer’s one. Clearly, the strategy of the application is greatly influenced by
the reputation value but other factors may also be taken into account.
4.1 Collecting Feedbacks
When a peer decides to evaluate the reputation value of a service provider, it asks first-
hand feedback from a set of witnesses in the network. Finding the right set of witnesses
is a challenging problem since the reputation value depends on their feedback. Our
approach for collecting feedbacks follows the spirit of the solution proposed by Yu et
al [20], in which feedbacks are collected by constructing chains of referrals through
which peers help one another to find witnesses. We adopt the walking principle. How-
ever, to minimize the ability of peers to collude, witnesses are randomly chosen within
the system. We assume, in the following, that the network is regular. Specifically, our
approach is based on a random walk (RW) sampling technique. We use the random
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walk technique as shown in Algorithm 1. Function query is invoked by the request-
ing peer that wishes to solicit x witnesses through r random walks bounded by ttl
steps. The requesting peer starts the random walks at a subset of its neighbors, and
runs them for ttl steps. Each peer p involved in the walk is designated as witness,
and as such sends back to the requesting peer its feedback. When a peer q receives
a request from p to rate server s, it checks whether during the last sliding window
of length D, it has ever interacted with s. In the affirmative, p sets its feedback to
F sp (t) ={(obssp(t0), t0),. . ., (obssp(tl), tl)} with obssp(ti) the QoS of s observed at time
ti, where ti ∈ [max(0, t−D), t]. In case p has not recently interacted with s, p sends
back to q a default feedback F sp (t) = {(obsmax,⊥)}. As will be shown later, this
feedback prevents p from being tagged “non participant” by q.
Because of non-participation (volunteer or because of a crash), random walks may
fail: it suffices that one of the peers in the walk refuses to participate or crashes to
prevent the walk from successfully ending. If we assume that among its d neighbors, a
fraction µ of them do not participate, then among the r initial peers that start a random
walk, the expected number of peer that may ”fail” their random walk is µr. Then during
the next step, µ(1− µ)r walks may ”fail”, and so on until the TTL value is reached. In
consequence, only x feedbacks may be received, with x =
∑ttl
t=1(1−µ)tr. By setting r
to xPttl
t=1(1−µ)
t
the requesting peer is guaranteed to receive at least x feedbacks (see line
5 in Algorithm 1). In addition to its feedback, each peer sends to the requesting peer
p (through the witness message, see lines 19 and 46) the identity of the next potential
witness on the walk, i.e., the peer it has randomly chosen among its neighbors. Sending
this piece of information allows p to know the identity of all potential witnesses. As will
be shown in Section 4.4, this allows to detect non participants (if any) and so to motivate
their participation through a “tit-for-tat” strategy. As for feedbacks, non participation
may prevent the requesting peer from receiving witness messages. A similar analysis to
the preceding one shows that if r random walks are initiated then y =
∑ttl−1
t=0 (1−µ)tr
witness messages will be received.
Note that a requesting peer can adapt its collect policy according to its knowledge
of the target server, or of its neighborhood. Specifically, to get x witnesses, a peer can
either increase ttl and restrict r, or increase r and lower ttl (assuming that r > µd
holds). Enlarging ttl would be more sensitive to colluding peers that bias the random
walk. However, this technique would increase the set of crawled witnesses, and thus
would afford new peers the opportunity to be known by other peers and consequently
to increase both their participation and their credibility. Conversely, enlarging r would
crawl only peers in the neighborhood of the requesting peer. However, this technique
would increase the chance to find a path that does not contain colluding peers 2.
2 Remark that selecting peers according to their credibility should be more efficient in the sense
that only “highly” credible peers would be selected, however, newcomers may be penalized by
this filtering. Furthermore, the resilience of the crawling technique to collusion highly relies
on the way the graph of witnesses is constructed. Studying these issues is part of our future
work.
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4.2 Reputation of a Server
Estimation of the reputation value of a target server is based on the QoS directly ob-
served at the server (if any) and on the feedbacks received during the collect phase.
The accuracy of the estimation depends on the way these informations are aggregated.
The aggregation function we propose answers the following qualitative and quantita-
tive preoccupations: First, to minimize the negative influence of unreliable information,
feedbacks are weighted by the credibility of their senders. Briefly, credibility is eval-
uated according to the past behavior of peers and reflects the confidence a peer has
in the received feedback. Credibility computation is presented in the next subsection.
Second, to prevent malicious nodes from flooding p with fake feedback and thus from
largely impacting the accuracy of its estimation, p keeps only a subset of each received
feedback. More precisely, among the set of observations sent by each witness over
the last D time units, only the last f ones are kept, with f the size of the smallest
non-empty set of non-default feedbacks received by p (i.e., f = mink∈Psp(t)(|F sk (t)|)
with t ∈ [max(0, t − D), t]). Finally, if among all the witnesses (including p) none
has recently directly interacted with s (i.e., f = 0), then p affects a maximal value
obsmax to s’s reputation value. Affecting a maximal value reflects the key concept of
the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence which argues that ”there is no causal relation-
ship between a hypothesis and its negation, so lack of belief does not imply disbelief”.
In our context, applying this principle amounts in fixing an an priori high reputation to
unknown servers, and then updating the judgment according to subsequent interactions
and observations [20].
We can now integrate these principles within the aggregation function we propose.
Let us first introduce some notations: Let Fsk(t) be the union of the last f non-default
feedbacks received from k during the last D time units (t ∈ [max(0, t−D), t]); Psp(t)
be the set of witnesses k for which Fsk(t) is non empty; ρsk(t) represent the mean value
of the observations drawn from Fsk(t); and csp,k(t) the credibility formed by p at time t
about k regarding s. Then, at time t, p estimates s’s reputation value as follows:
rsp(t) =
{
1P
k∈Psp(t)
cs
p,k
(t)
∑
k∈Psp(t)
csp,k(t).ρ
s
k(t) if f 6= ∅
obsmax otherwise
(1)
with, ρsk(t) = 1f
∑
(obss
k
(t′),t′)∈Fs
k
(t) obs
s
k(t
′)
4.3 Trust in Witnesses
In this section, we tackle the issue of malicious peers. As remarked in the Introduc-
tion, malicious peers may alter the efficiency of the reputation mechanism by sending
feedbacks that over-estimate or sub-estimate the observed QoS of a server to inflate or
tarnish its reputation. This is all the more true in case of collusion. We tackle this issue
by evaluating peers credibility. Credibility is a [0,1]-valued function which represents
the confidence formed by peer p about the truthfulness of q’s ratings. This function is
local and is evaluated on the recent past behavior of both p and q peers. It is locally
used to prevent a false credibility from being propagated within the network. Specif-
ically, peer p estimates at time t how credible q is regarding server s as a decreasing
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function of the distance between q’s feedbacks on s’s effort and p’s direct observations
on s’s QoS. As for the reputation value computation, the distance is computed on the
last f observations made by both p and q during the last D time units. Note that in case
p has not recently observed s’s QoS, then credibility of all its witnesses are set to a de-
fault value c0. Indeed, p cannot evaluate the distance between its own observations and
those observed by witnesses. Determining c0 value needs to solve the following trade-
off: by affecting a high value to the default credibility one increases the vulnerability
of the system to the whitewashing phenomenon, that is, the fact that peers change their
identity in order to reset their credibility to the default value. However, by setting this
variable to a low value the mechanism tends to filter out new witnesses and thus, loses
the benefit of the potential information a new peer can afford, which clearly decreases
the usefulness of the reputation mechanism. In order to cope with that, we set c0 to
the value of a decreasing function of φ, with φ an estimation of the number of white-
washers in the network. By adopting the notations of Equation 1, csp,q(t) represents the
credibility formed by p at time t about q regarding the target server s, and is given by:
csp,q(t) =
{
1− |ρsq(t)− ρsp(t)|α if f 6= ∅
c0 otherwise
(2)
where |ρsq(t) − ρsp(t)|α represents the distance between q and p’s observations. Note
that α is the variable introduced in Section 3. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1. (Credibility Accuracy) Eventually, credibility of a peer q evaluated by any
correct peer p reflects q’s behavior with a precision ǫ. That is, let β ∈]0, 1[ be some
fixed real, there exists t such that, for all t ≥ t,
Prob(|csp,q(t)− wsq(t)| ≤ ǫ) ≥ 1− β.
4.4 Incentive for Participation
Non participation may jeopardize the efficiency of the reputation mechanism. A cer-
tain amount of participation is required before reputation can induce a significant level
of cooperation. Facing non-participation in the reputation problem is challenging and
has deserved few attention [20]. To motivate peers to send their feedback we adopt a
“tit-for-tat” strategy. We introduce the level of participation notion as the propensity of a
peer for replying to a rating request. It is described by function lsp,q such that lsp,q(t) rep-
resents the percentage of times q provided its feedback to p’s queries regarding server
s’s QoS over the last D time units, with lsp,q(t = 0) = l0 = 1. Its computation is per-
formed after p’s collect phase (see line 10 of the algorithm. Note that factor µ prevents
correct peers from being penalized by walking breaks.).
We apply the tit-for-tat strategy during the collect phase. When a peer p receives a
rating request for s from peer q, then with probability lsp,q(t) p provides its feedback
to q, otherwise it sends a default feedback (⊥,⊥) to prevent p from being tagged as
non-participant. By providing this default feedback, p lets q knows that its recent non-
participation has been detected. Consequently, by not participating, requesting peers
drive correct witnesses providing them worthless feedback, which clearly makes their
reputation mechanism useless. Hence there is a clear incentive for non participating
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peers to change their behavior. The following lemma proves that participation decreases
the bias of the reputation value. As previously, let us consider two peers p and q such
that both peers are indistinguishable from the point of view of the servers with which
they interact, that is both p and q observe the same QoS from these servers at the very
same time, solicit and are solicited by the same set of peers at the same time; However,
p is correct while q is non participating. Then we claim that:
Lemma 2. Participation decreases the bias of the reputation value. That is,
|E(rsp(t)) − q∗s | ≤ |E(rsq(t))− q∗s |
4.5 Incentive for Truthful Feedbacks
We now address the problem of motivating peers to send truthful feedbacks. So far
we have presented strategies aiming at improving the quality of the reputation value
estimation by aggregating more feedbacks and by weighting feedback according to the
credibility of their sender. We have shown that by using both strategies, utility of correct
peers increases. However, none of these solutions have an impact on the effort devoted
by a witness to send a truthful feedback. To tackle this issue we use the credibility
as a way to differentiate honest peers from malicious ones. As for non-participating
peers, when peer p receives a request to rate server s from a requesting peer q then p
satisfies q’s request with probability csp,q(t). By doing so, p satisfies q’s request if it
estimates that q is trustworthy, otherwise it notifies q of its recent faulty behavior by
sending it the (⊥,⊥) feedback. As previously, by cheating, a malicious peer penalizes
itself by pushing correct witnesses to send meaningless feedbacks to it, leading to its
effective isolation. We claim that this social exclusion-based strategy motivates q to
reliably cooperate.
Lemma 3. High credibility decreases the bias of the reputation value. That is,
|E(rsp(t)) − q∗s | ≤ |E(rsq(t))− q∗s |
Finally, to elicit sufficient and honest participation, both strategies are combined,
i.e., upon receipt of a rating request from peer q, with probability min(csp,q(t), lsp,q(t))
p provides its feedback, otherwise it sends the default feedback (⊥,⊥) (see line 31 in
Algorithm 1).
Theorem 1. The reputation mechanism described in Algorithm 1 is Incentive-Compatible
in the sense of Property 2.
5 Analysis
Computing the reputation of a peer reduces to estimating, in the statistical sense, its
effort. Our algorithm falls into the category of robust estimation algorithms. Indeed,
robust estimation techniques consider populations where a non-negligible subset of data
deliberately pollute the system. This analysis describes the asymptotic behavior of the
reputation mechanism and its convergence time according to undesirable behaviors. In
the following, we assume that a fraction γ of witnesses are malicious.
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5.1 Asymptotic Behavior
In this section we determine the accuracy of the reputation mechanism with respect to
parameters α and ǫ. Thus for the purpose of this analysis, we assume that the number
of aggregated feedbacks f is infinite. Recall that wq denotes the characterization of
q’s behavior, with wq = 1 if q is correct, and wq = 1 − dα otherwise. By Lemma 1,
csp,q(t) = wq , when t→∞. Moreover, the expected number of correct witnesses is (1−
γ)n+1 while the expected number of malicious ones is γn, with n the expected number
of witnesses (Figures are plotted for n = 10). Thus, by replacing csp,q(t) with their
asymptotic values in Equation 1, the expected reputation value of a server s estimated
by a correct peer p when t→∞ is given by Equation 3:
rsp(t)t→∞ =
1
1− γdα + 1
n
((
1− γ + 1
n
)
q∗s + γ (1− dα) q
)
. (3)
The bias of the reputation value, when t→∞ is given by the following equation:
|rsp(t)t→∞ − q∗s | = γd
1− dα
1− γdα + 1
n
. (4)
Figures 1 and 2 show the bias of the reputation value with respect to d for increas-
ing values of γ (resp. increasing values of α). Recall that d = |q∗s−q| reflects colluders’
behavior. Unlike mean-based reputation value estimation for which the bias linearly in-
creases with d (as shown by the crossed curves in Figure 1), our algorithm bounds the
power of colluders whatever their percentage (dotted curves). Indeed, witnesses’ ratings
are weighted by a decreasing function of d which filters out false ratings.
Figure 2 shows the impact of α on the bias of the reputation value. As can be ob-
served, the bias decreases with decreasing values of α, reflecting the sensitivity of the
reputation value to the distance between direct observations and received feedbacks.
Thus, decreasing values of α makes the reputation mechanism very sensitive to false
feedbacks.
Theorem 2. The reputation value is ǫ-accurate, with ǫ > γd 1−dα
1−γdα+ 1
n
.
From the above, assuming an upper bound on γ, by setting the maximal bias to ǫ and
solving the corresponding equation one can derive an upper bound on α under which
the reputation value converges to the true effort with an accuracy level of ǫ. Hence, for
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α with α ≤ α, the reputation value converges to the true effort with an accuracy level
of ǫ, with α given by:
α =
ln
(
n+1−
√
(1−γ)n2+(2−γ)n+1
γn
)
ln(ǫ)
(5)
To conclude, one can always find a value of α such that eventually the reputation value
is accurate. This parameter, however, significantly influences the convergence time of
the algorithm. The next Section addresses this issue.
5.2 Convergence
In this section, we study the convergence time of the reputation mechanism. To do so,
we assume that the ratings of a malicious peer are drawn from a normal distribution with
mean q and variance σ over [0, 1]. This assumption includes a wide range of possible
behaviors. Indeed, a small value of σ depicts peers that try to rapidly skew the reputation
value to q by giving reports tightly distributed around q. In contrast, a high value of σ
depicts peers that try to hide their mischievous behavior to other peers by giving sparse
reports. While the first behavior is easily detected, the second one hardly skew the
reputation value to q.
Recall that the reputation value is estimated by aggregating the last f interactions
witnesses have had with the target server during a sliding time window of length D.
Finding the optimal value of D is important. Indeed, it determines the resilience of the
mechanism to effort changes and the confidence level in the estimation. The optimal
value of D is the one for which the estimation is at most ǫ-far from the true effort
with a given confidence threshold β. To determine such a value, let us first assume
that f is known, and determine a lower bound on Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ǫ) ∀t ∈ D.
Suppose that the credibility csk(t) is ǫ′-far fromwsk for all the witnesses k. Then, because
of Bayes’ Theorem, we know that Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤ ǫ) ≥ Prob(|rsp(t) − q∗s | ≤
ǫ||cs
k
(t)−ws
k
(t)|≤ǫ′,∀k∈Psp(t)
) · Prob(|csk(t) − wsk(t)| ≤ ǫ′, ∀k ∈ Psp(t)). Remark that,
assuming that the witnesses’ credibility are ǫ′-far from wsk, the probability that rsp(t)
is ǫ-far from q∗s is maximal under the following condition (C): credibility of correct
witnesses is minimal, i.e., equal to 1 − ǫ′, and the one of malicious ones is maximal,
i.e., equal to ǫ′. Then, we have:
Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ǫ) ≥ Prob(|rsp(t)− q∗s | ≤ ǫ|(C))·
Prob(csk(t) ≥ 1− ǫ′|kcorrect)(1−γ)n · Prob(csk(t) ≤ ǫ′|kmalicious)γn (6)
By Lemma 1, the probability that the witness’s credibility is at most ǫ′-far from wsk con-
verges to 1 when t, and thus f , increase. Thus, this bound approaches Prob(|rsp(t) −
q∗s | ≤ ǫ) when f increases. Knowing the probability distribution of the reports, deriving
a closed form of the lower bound can be done. Then, given a desired confidence thresh-
old β for α ≥ α, solution of Equation 7 provides two threshold values of d (d1 and d2
on Figure 2) beyond which the false reports are eliminated:
ǫ = γd
1− dα
1− γdα + 1
n
within [0, 1]. (7)
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Using Equation 6, we can see the effect of α on the convergence time of the reputa-
tion mechanism to reach the exact effort exerted by the server (see Figure 3). Decreasing
values of α significantly increases the convergence time while it decreases the bias of
the reputation mechanism as shown in Figure 2. Thus a trade-off exists between the
robustness of the mechanism and its convergence time. By setting the value of D, the
application designer may derive the corresponding minimal number of interactions f
and finally tune the value of α such that the desired confidence level is achieved within
f steps through Equation 6. The resulting reputation estimation is less sensitive to false
reports, but still eliminates peers that try to skew the reputation of the server to a value
that is far from the true effort, by filtering out extreme values of d (see Figure 2).
Finally, Figure 4 shows the impact of malicious peers on the convergence time. As
can be seen, a relatively small percentage of malicious peers has a minor impact on the
convergence time since the number of correct feedbacks is hardly influenced by false
ones. On the other hand, whenever a requesting peer has to face a large proportion of
malicious peers, it can only rely on its own feedback to estimate the effort exerted by
the target server which clearly takes longer than when helped by correct witnesses. The
same result applies for non-participating peers.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a reputation mechanism that achieves high robustness
to attacks and provides incentive for participation. This is achieved by an aggregation
function in which a subset of the information provided by randomly chosen peers is
kept and weighted by a confidence factor locally computed. We have proposed a simple
and local incentive mechanism that guarantees a better quality of the reputation value
estimation. Lessons learned from simulations are twofold: first, decreasing values of α
guarantees a greater sensibility of the mechanism to false ratings. It however increases
the number of required feedbacks as well, and thus the time to get an accurate estima-
tion of the effort exerted by the target server. Second, the presence of a large number
of malicious and non-participating peers does not prevent the mechanism from being
accurate, however has an impact on its convergence time.
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input : p: requesting peer; s: target server; x: expected number of feedbacks
output: rsp: estimation of s reputation value
r← xPttl
l=1
(1−µ)l
; y ←
Pttl−1
l=0 (1− µ)
lr;1
ttl← default value; t← getTime(); let D be the the time interval [max(t-D,0),t];2
query(p,s,ttl,r,t);3
wait until ((F sq (t) messages are received from x peers) and (witness(s, w, t) messages5
are received from y peers));
P s(t) ←
S
{q such that a feedback message is received from q};6
F s(t) ←
S
{F sq (t) for all q ∈ P (t)};7
W s(t) ←
S
{w for all witness(s,w, t) that have been received};8
foreach k ∈ W (t) do10
lsp,k(t) ← min(
P
t∈D(|P|k(t)|P
t∈D |W|k(t)|
(1− µ) + µ.l0, 1);11
end12
return rsp(t) to application;13
query(p,s,ttl,r,t) begin14
New ← pick a random subset of r peers from p’s neighbors;15
forall (next ∈ New) do16
send a rw (p, s, ttl− 1,t) message to next;17
send a witness (s,next,t) message to p;19
if p has interacted with s at time t0, . . . , tl in the last D time units then21
F sp (t) ← {(obs
s
p(t0), t0), . . . , (obs
s
p(tl), tl), p};22
else23
F sp (t) ← {(obsmax,⊥), p};24
end if25
send F sp (t) to p;26
end27
end28
upon (receipt of a rw (p,s,ttl,t) message at peer q) do29
with (probability min(lsp,q(t), csp,q(t)) do31
if q has interacted with s at time t0, . . . , tl in the last D time units then33
F sq (t) ← {(obs
s
q(t0), t0), . . . , (obs
s
q(tl), tl), q};34
else35
F sq (t) ← {(obsmax,⊥), q};36
end if37
otherwise38
F sq (t) ← {(⊥,⊥), q};39
end do40
send F sq (t) to p;41
if (ttl 6= 0) then42
next← pick one of q’s neighbor with probability 1
d
, d = q’s neighbors #;43
send a rw (p,s,ttl− 1,t) message to next;44
send a witness (s,next,t) to p;46
end if47
end do48
Algorithm 1: Estimation of the reputation value of server s by peer p
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